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At pr~sent,WestCoastrefineries are unable
to utilize all of the crude oil produced on the
Alaskan.North Slope, largely because of the
eff~9ts. of restrictive governmental regulations.
Re~trictions on sulfur-dioxide emissions, for
example, have forced refiners to install more
desulfurization capacity in order to process the
high-sulfur Alaskan crude. At the same time,
price controls on refined petroleum products
have reduced the incentive for refiners to invest
in such capacity-or to invest in the capacity
required to tailor the Alaskan end-product mix
closer to the regional end-product demand.
Other regulations have forced the oil industry
to use inefficient methods for delivering surplus
Alaskan oil to other regions of the United
States. At present, U.S. tankers carry that oil to
Gulf Coast refineries through the Panama Can-
al, which is a relatively high-cost method for
dealing with the surplus. However, this is the
only currently available option, because oflaws
which effectively ban Alaskan oil exports and
prohibit the use of foreign vessels in U.S.
intercoastal trade, and because of lengthy per-
mit processes which have long delayed the
construction of domestic pipelines. These diffi-
culties also reduce the incentive to develop
Alaskan resources, since North Slope produ-
cers' higher transportation costs reduce the
wellhead price which they now receive.
The proposals for eliminating the surplus
generally focus on increasing the ability ofWest
Coast refineries to utilize heavy high-sulfur
crude or on developing alternative transporta-
tion and marketing options. Some observers
propose expanding West Coast refinery desul-
furization capacity, or even constructing a de-
sulfurization facility at the terminus of the
Trans-Alaska pipeline system itself. Others pro-
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pose transportation alternatives, including pipe-
lines to.convey the surplus to other domestic
markets or international exchange ("swap")
arrangements which would achieve the same
aim indirectly.
Other alternatives have hardly been consid-
ered, although they might be even more efficient
methods for dealing with the Alaskan-oil prob-
lem. These include the possible relaxation of
California environmental-quality standards and
the use of foreign-flag tankers in U.S. inter-
coastal trade. Policymakers apparently believe
that such measures would undermine other
high-priority national objectives, such as pro-
tection of the environment and national securi-
ty, and hence they will not be discussed further
here. This paper instead analyzes certain trans-
portation and marketing alternatives, to deter-
mine whether the various options would help
achieve the key objective of the nation's energy
policy: namely, to reduce U.S. dependence on
foreign-oil imports and to reduce its vulnerabili-
ty to supply interruption.
The first section provides background infor-
mation on the development of the Alaskan
North Slope oil reserves and the reasons for the
current surplus relative to West Coast refinery
capacity. It attributes the surplus largely to the
particular density and sulfur characteristics of
North Slope crude, and to the limited refinery
capacity existing on the West Coast for process-
ing that crude into the products demanded by
end-users in the region. The second and third
sections consider the alternatives to the current
inefficient method of dealing with the surplus,
that is, shipment by U.S. flag tanker to Gulf
Coast refineries through the Panama Canal.
The analysis shows that export exchanges
represent the most efficient method of market-
ing Alaskan North Slope crude, and thus would
result in the greatest producer cost savings onthe crude that otherwise would be shipped
through the Panama Canal. As a result, ex-
changes would provide the greatest producer
return at the wellhead, and thus the greatest
incentive for increased Alaskan oil production.
On the other hand, exchanges would increase
gross imports relative to other alternatives, and
thus would embody a higher risk of supply
interruption. Largely on these grounds of ener-
gy security, Congress to date has maintained
restrictions on the export of Alaskan oil.
I. Development of the Alaskan Oil "Surplus"
The huge Prudhoe Bay oil deposit on the
Alaskan North Slope-estimated to contain
some 9.4 billion barrels of crude-was dis-
covered in early 1968, but none of that oil came
to market until nine years later, because of
environmental controversies and delays in de-
veloping a delivery route. But with the help of
the energy-crisis atmosphere created by the 1973
Arab oil embargo, Congress authorized the
accelerated construction of the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline System. The 789-mile pipeline, linking
the vast Prudhoe Bay field with the southern
Alaskan port of Valdez, was completed in July
1977 with an initial capacity of 1.2 million
barrels per day, and with an ultimate design
capacity of 2.0 million bid. North Slope pro-
duction began in mid-I977, and outputgradual-
ly expanded to the 1.2 million bld level by
September 1978, with a further increase to 1.5
million bid attained by late 1979.
Reasons for the surplus
The Federal Energy Administration and the
oil industry originally believed that West Coast
consumption of refined petroleum products
would continue to grow at the 5-percent annual
rate experienced during the decade preceding
the 1973 oil embargo. They thus predicted that
West Coast (District 5) refineries would be able
to utilize the entire production of Alaskan
North Slope crude anticipated during the first
few years of pipeline operation. I But the Arab
oil embargo, the attendant sharp run-up in
world oil prices, and the 1974-75 recession all
led to an alteration of historical consumption
patterns. West Coast consumption of refined
products increased at only a 2Y2-percent annual
rate during the recession and recovery of the
1974-78 period, so that refinery crude-oil re-
quirements fell considerably below the original
forecasts.
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The process was complicated by the fact that
West Coast refineries lacked the sp~cialized
equipment required to process the relatively
heavy, high-sulfur Alaskan crude, to make the
end-product mix produced from that oil Gan-
form more closely with the composition of the
region's end-product demand.2 Gasoline, jet
fuel, diesel and other "light" products distilled
in the initial stages of refining account for the
bulk of West Coast product demand. But Noah
Slope crude yields a relatively large percentage
of high-sulfur residual products, such as heavy
fuel oil, asphalt and petroleum coke. Moreover,
even after those products are removed in the
refining process, a heavy residuum remains,
which can be converted into the desirable light
products only through the use of additional
expensive cracking equipment.
The high-sulfur content of North Slope crude
also poses major emission-control problems
under current air-quality regulations. California
utilities, under pressure to reduce their sulfur-
dioxide (SO 2) emissions, require residual oil
with a sulfur content of no more than 0.5
percent. But Western refiners cannot provide
utilities with a fuel oil of that type from North
Slope crude without the use ofexpensive desulf-
urization equipment.
Yet the economic environment under domes-
tic oil-price controls has not provided refiners
with the incentive to make those necessary
investments. Under the Federal price-control
system instituted in 1973, refiners were permit-
ted to raise their prices above the May 15, 1973
level to reflect increased costs. But for certain
products-gasoline, diesel fuel and home heat-
ing fuel-refiners could allocate increased costs
only proportionally to the volume of such
products produced.3
For items such as gasoline, production costs
are disproportionately high relative to theirshare oUotal production, so that refiners have
been unable to pass on allofthe increased costs
ofsuch items. Indeed, price controls ongasoline
Were liberalized to permita better recovery of
costs only in March 1979. Moreover, strict
environmental requirements·often have posed a
roadblockto the expansion or modification of
refinery .. "capacity. Environmental·regulations
andprice controls onrefinedproductsthus have
been largely responsible for the surplus of
Alaskan oilon the West Coast.
Chart 1
Sources of West Coast(District V) Crude Oil Supplies1
1975 ~1III",,1IIlI1III.1I111l1".
I. District V includes Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii,
Nevada, Oregon and Washington.
hoe Bay production--that state's share of total
West Coast supplies rose from 10 to 44 percent.4
California's share meanwhile dropped from 45
to 35 percent, although fllat state experienced
rising output over the period. More important-
ly, foreign oil imports declined sharply both in
absolute volume and as a share oftotalsupplies
(from 43 to 21 percent). By 1978, imports of
"Backing out" imports
Nevertheless, within the limits oftheirtechni-
cal capacity to process relatively heavy, high-
sulfur crude, West Coast refineries have been
able to use North Slope crude to "back out" or
displace foreign oil ofcomparable quality. This
is shown in the changing composition of West
Coast refinery crude-oil supplies (Table 1 and
Chart 1). As Alaskan oil production rose from
about 191,000 b!d to 1.2 million b!d over the
1975-78 period-reflecting the start-up ofPrud-
o 2800
Table 1
Origins of West Coast Crude Oil Supplies'
(thousands of barrels per day)
Percent of
Total Supplies
1975 1976 1977 1978 1975 1918
Total West Coast Production 1076.1 1068.7 1424.4 217l.6 54.7 79.3
Alaska 191.3 173.1 463.6 1216.0 9.7 44.4
California 882.7 893.2 957.8 951.2 44.9 34.7
All Other West Coast' 2.1 1.8 3.0 4.4 .1 .2
Imports From Other States 38.7 17.6 3.9 2.2 2.0 .1
Foreign Imports 851.5 1008.8 1040.8 564.9 43.3 20.6
Total Crude Oil Supplies 1966.3 2095.1 2469.1 2738.7 100.0 100.0
1 Including lease condensate (i.e., natural gas liquid).
2 Arizona and Nevada.
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Energl' Data Reports: Crude Petroleum,
Petroleum Products, And Natural Gas Liquids; and Energy Data Reports:Crude Petroleum. Petroleum Products.
And Natural Gas Liquids in P.A.D. District V.
5sour (high-sulfur) crude from Saudi Arabia,
Iran and other Persian Gulf nations had largely
been displaced (Table 2), and import~ofsweet
(low-sulfur) crude, except. Indonesian. sweet
crude, also declined over the 1975-78 period.
Recent data suggestthat furtherdisplacement
ofimports occurred duringthe first halfof1979.
During that period, the shortage of foreign oil
and consequent shortage of gasoline>encou-
raged West Coast refineries to run less efficient-
ly so as to make additional use of North Slope
oil. Indeed, as 1979 progressed, the Alaskan oil
surplus dwindled as those refineries absorbed
1.0 million bid of the 1.2 million bld flowing
from Prudhoe Bay. But in November, a project
to raise the capacity and flowthrough. of.the
Trans-Alaska pipeline to 1.5 million bld was
completed, raising the surplus by year-end to
about 500,000 bid. The 1.0 million bid now
being absorbed by refineries may representjust
about. a maximum, given the limitations on
their capacity for processing high-sulfur crude.
As a result, a 500,000 bid surplus ofAlaskan oil
now exists in terms of Western refinery con-
sumption.
Table 2
Origins of West Coast Crude 011 Imports
(thousands of barrels per day)
Percent of
Total Supplies







1975 1976 1977 1978 1975 1978
295.4 450.0 424.1 386.4 34.7 68.4
5.3 15.2 60.6 41.6 .6 7.4
163.5 87.3 20.1 11.9 19.2 2.1
5.3 4.3 4.3 1.8 .6 .3
22.2 30.0 10.5 0 2.6 0
491.7 586.8 519.6 441.7 57.7 78.2
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Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Energy Data Reports: Crude Petroleum.
Petroleum Products, and Natural Gas Liquids.
6II. Alternatives for Dealing with the Surplus
The present 500,000 bl d "surplus" of Alaskan
North Slope crl1de is noW' shipped by U.S. flag
taIlk~rs.frorn •. t~e .. ;\lfsk~ ..IJipeline terminusft
Vald.fi.g/ito.(iulfCoast •.•refineries •• through the
Pa.nama Canal (Figure 1). But this is one ofthe
most costly ways of marketing Alaskan oil,
thostly because the Jones Act, of 1917 vintage,
requires that all domestic cargoes be carried by
U.S. flag vessels. The present transportation
system also yields Alaskan producers a relative-
ly lower price at the wellhead.s This is because
petroleum's selling price in any given market is
based on the average landed price for compar-
able quality OPEC crude, which means that
~orth Slope producers must absorb transporta-
tion costs in order to compete agaInst foreign
crude in those markets.
In the interest of raising the wellhead price,
those producers have proposed several alterna-
tiyes for dealing with the surplus Alaskan. oil.
These alternatives have included: 1) construc-
tion of additional desulfurization and cracking
911pacity on the West Coast; 2) construction of
()"erland pipelines to U.S. refineries farther
East; and 3) exchanges with foreign nations on a
barrel-for-barrel basis. In the latter two cases,
domestic markets farther East would eventually
receive the Alaskan oil, or equivalent amounts
offoreign oil acquired through exchanges.
Refinery modification option
The West Coast (District 5) market~serviced
primarily by California and Washington
terineries~is the most attractive domestic mar-
ket for Alaskan crude. West Coast sales yield
North Slope producers the greatest price at the
wellhead, because of that market's proximity to
the production source and therefore low trans-
portation costs. The surplus thus could be
r~duced ifoil firms installed the crackingcapac-
ity and desulfurization equipment necessary to
handle greater amounts of North Slope crude,
eitherate~istingWest Coast refineries orat new
f~cilities> near the Trans-Alaska pipeline termi-
nus at.yaldez.••.Retrofitting existing refineries
would enable those plants to utilize greater
quantities of high-sulfur Alaskan crude. Con-
struction of a desulfurization plant at Valdez,
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on the other hand, could supply West Coast
refineries with larger quantities of low-sulfur
crude, well-suited to present refinery configura-
tions and end-product demand.
Pipeline option
Some government and industry leaders have
proposed building pipelines as a means of
transporting the West Coast surplus to U.S.
marketsfarther East(Figure 1). Domestic altef..
natives include the Sohio(PACTEX) line or the
Northern Tier line, both ofwhich would traverse
only U.S. territoI}'. ButthereareseveralCanadi-
an alternatives~theTrans-Mountain, Kitimat
and Foothills pipelines~although only the for-
mer appears to beaviablecompetitorto the U.S.
pipelines.
a) Sohio pipeline. In 1974, Standard Oil
Company of Ohio (Sohio)~which is a partnet
of British Petroleum, the major North Slop¢
producer~began to develop plans for a $1-
billion project to move crude from Long Beach,
California, to Midland, Texas. The proposed
PACTEX system would include construction of
a terminal at Long Beach, conversion of 778
miles of an existing natural-gas pipeline, and
construction ofabout 215 miles ofnew pipeline,
with an initial capacity ofabout 500,000 bld.
In March 1979, however, Sohio announced
that it was abandoning the PACTEX project
because of delays in pipeline authorization,
which it said made the project no longer eco-
nomically feasible. The company had counted
on the pipeline being in operation in 1978, when
the surplus first developed. But now, even if
construction were to start immediately, the
pipeline would not be completed until sometiII1~
in 1982~not too long before a projected decline
in Prudhoe Bay production. The company
claims that it could not justify the pipeline on
the basis of as yet undiscovered and undeve-
loped Alaskan resources. The pipeline may not
be completely dead, however, because the Fed...
eralgoverllrnentwouldlike to revivethe project
on national-security grounds.
b) Northern Tierpipeline. TheAdministration
has announced its support for a $1.4-billionFigyre .1
Alaskan Crude.QU.·IransportationAlternatives
............... Current tanker route via Panama Canal
Existing pipelines
Proposed pipelines
- -~ Proposed tanker route to Japan (equivalent amount to be returned to United States)
Note: The Trans-Mountain proposal calls for the reversal and possible expansion of that existing east-to-west pipeline.project developed by a· number of railroads,
consulting firms·and smalloilcompanies, which
would movecrude between PortAngeles, Wash-
in.gton, andClearbrook, Mirinesota, and thence
byexisting pipelinestorefirieriesintheMidwest-
ernstates. The project would entailconstruction
of a maririe terminal atP6rt Angeles, and a
1,568-milepipelinefrom thereto Clearbrook,
with initial capacity of 600,000 bl d.
The pipeline would be especially helpful for
refineries in the Northern Tier states bordering
on Canada (such as Montana, North Dakota
and Minnesota). Those refineries are almost
wholly dependent upon Canadian crude, which
will become unavailable after 1982 because of
Canada's own domestic needs.
Export·exchange option
Under export-exchange (swap) arrangements,
Alaskan. oil would be shipped to Japan, .in
exchange for which an equivalent amount of
Japan-bound foreign-produced crude would be
diverted to the U.S. Gulfor East Coasts. Mexi-
co has been frequently mentioned·as a possible
third party in sucha swap arrangement. How-
ever,this option remains precluded by the
Trans-Alas~a Pipeline Authorizatioll Act of
1973 and also by the 1977 and 1979 amend-
ments to the Export Administration Act.
The 1973 legislation prohibits exports of
domestic crude oil transported by pipeline over
Federal rights-of-way---unless such exports are
exchanged with adjacent nationS to promote
transportation efficiency, or unless the Presi-
dent finds that an export transaction is in the
national interest and does not "diminish the
totalquaritity or quality of petroleum available
to the UnitedStates."The restriction.s have been
tightened even further by·the 1977 and 1979
amendments to the Export Admin.istration Act.
The latest legislation requires the President to
certify that any export proposalwould actually
help reduce the cost to refineries, distributors
and consumers, and also requires explicit Con-
gressi()nalapproval of any export transaction.
III. The Altemativesand National Energy Policy
In deciding upon the appropriate method for
dealing with surplus Alaskan oil, policymakers
should consider not only the relative efficiency
ofthe various options, butalso the contribution
they can make to the nation's energy-policy goal
of reduced U.S. dependence on foreign oil.
Alaskan North Slope production, since coming
on stream in July 1977, has contributed signifi-
cantly to that goal. Production has risen gradu-
ally to a current level of 1.5 million bl d, displac-
ing a roughly equivalent amount of foreign
crude oilatU.S. refineries onthe West and Gulf
Coasts.
OPEC oil alone rising from 20 to 42 percent of
total consumption. Between 1972 and 1977, oil
imports in value terms jumped from $5 billion
to $45 billion, and thus accounted for a major
share ofthe nation's deteriorating foreign-trade
balance. This situation reflected the effects of
domestic oil-price controls in encouraging the
growth of consumption and discouraging in-
Chart 2





Priorto the start-up of Prudhoe Bay produc-
United States had made no real prog-
ress in slowing the import flow, despite the
nearly fivefold increase in world oil prices over
the 1972-77 period. On the contrary, imports of
crudean.drefiriedptoducts··almostdoubled
between 1972 and 1977, toa record high of8.8
millionbId (Chart 2).Overthe fiVe-year period,
imported oil jumped from 29 to 46 percent of










But imports increased again in 1979, despite a
slight decline in U.S. petroleum consumption.
This came about as domestic crude-oil produc-
tion resumed its decline in the face of a stable
North Slope production rate of 1.2 million
bld at least until late in the year when produc-
tion rose to 1.5 million bid. In fact, Energy
Department projections suggest that imports
could rise to 13 million bid by 1990, even with a
modest 2-percent average annual increase in
U.S. petroleum consumption.7 At that point,
imports would comprise more than 50 percent
oftotal domestic consumption. Thatlevel ofoil-
import dependency could place a severe strain
on the U.S. balance of payments-~andon the
international value of the dollar-especially in
view of the expected continuation of sharp
increases in world oil prices.8
To forestall that development, the Adminis-
tration announced its proposed oil-import re-
duction program in July 1979. Over the long-
run, the program focuses heavily on the
development ofsynthetic fuels to reduce import
requirements. However, it will take at least a
decade or more for the production of oil from
coal and shale to reach a significant volume. In
the short-run, therefore, a solution will have to
involve both the conservation and increased
domestic production of conventional crude oil.
Expansion ofdomestic production
At the present time, Alaska provides the best
hope of once again reversing the declining pat-
tern of domestic oil production. Despite a
recent lowering of estimates of undiscovered
recoverable oil resources, Alaska continues to
be the nation's most promising target for petro-
leum exploration and development. Indeed,
according to the latest (1975) estimates of the
U.S. Geological Survey, Alaskan fields proba-
bly contain 12 to 49 billion barrels of undis-
covered oil-about one-third of the nation's
total undiscovered oil resources (Table 3). But
the bulk of these potential resources may be
located offshore in the Outer Continental Shelf,
and thus may require vast sums to develop.
Based on existing proven reserves, Alaska's
crude oil production may decline around the
mid-1980's as the Prudhoe Bay reservoir be-


















Source: U.S. Geological Survey. Geological E51imates of
Undiscovered Recoverable OilandGas Resources
in the United States, Geological Survey Circular










creased domestic production. Between 1972 and
1977, U.S. consumption of refined petroleum
products rose by 12 percent, while domestic
crude production dropped by 13 percent.
Late in 1977, however, North Slope oil began
to displace some foreign crude of comparable
sulfuq:ontent and gravity, not only in the West
but in other areas of the nation. Imports of
crude and refined products fell nearly 9 percent
in volume and 6 percent in value terms in 1978.
This displacement occurred because North
Slope producers had priced their crude compe-
titively on a delivered-cost basis with
comparable-quality foreign oil, and because
refiners purchasing North Slope crude had
received the same entitlement benefits for Alas-
kan as for foreign oil.6
10the state's undeveloped resources will have to be
translated into proven reserves. The extent to
which producers are encouraged to make those
necessary investments will depend upon the
prices realized at the wellhead. That incentive
has improved dramatically over the course of
the past year because of sharply rising OPEC
selling prices-and because the U.S. govern-
ment has permitted North Slope crude to be
priced competitively in all markets with
comparable-quality imported oil, provided the
producer price at the wellhead does not exceed
the upper-tier ceiling. For the past few months,
North Slope wellhead prices have been bumping
against the Federal ceilings, currently at
$13.55/barrel. But producers will benefit from
higher OPEC selling prices as domestic crude-
oil prices are gradually deregulated by late 1981.
For any given selling price, a reduction in
transportation costs also increases the producer
price at the wellhead. So when policymakers
determine the appropriate means for dealing
with the West Coast surplus, they must consider
the extent to which each alternative would
lower transportation costs. It is assumed that
North Slope producers, in the absence of an
export ban, would be permitted to exchange
only that volume of production which West
Coast refineries cannot handle. Otherwise, they
would be tempted to market all oftheir produc-
tion overseas, because transportation costs as-
sociated with export exchanges would be even
lower than those incurred in supplying the
Western refinery market.
Nonetheless, rising world oil prices represent
the dominant factor in boosting Alaskan well-
head prices, and thus in stimulating increased
production. After all, North Slope producers
generally stand to benefit on their entire pro-
duction from every increase in the OPEC price,
whereas transportation-cost savings on the sur-
plus would increase the wellhead price for only
that volume ofoil that otherwise would have to
be shipped through the Panama Canal. During
the first half of 1979 alone, wellhead prices for
North Slope oil sold on the West and Gulf
Coasts rose by 75 and 112 percent, respectively,
simply on the basis of the sharp run-up in the
OPEC landed prices for comparable-quality'
oil.9 Still further sharp increases were realized
II
after July I when OPEC prices were raised in
several stages again.
Producer after-tax revenues could be in-
creased further by reductions in Alaskan state
taxesand/or Federal income taxes (Table 4).
Transportation cost savings, by raising the
wellhead.price on applicable volumes, would
also provide an incentive to expand
production-in addition to economizing on rea!
economic resources. But none of these avenues
would offer as much potential reliefas increases
in world oil prices.
Policy trade-offs
Two questions must be asked regarding the
various alternatives for dealing with the Alaskan
oil surplus. How much would each reduce trans-
portation costs, and thus provide increased in-
centive for the expansion of domestic produc-
tion? And how much would each stimulate the
development of the domestic refining capacity
and1or transportation network required to uti-
lize domestic production efficiently within the
United States? The difficulty in selecting an
appropriate strategy, of course, is that the op-
tions involve trade-offs among various policy
objectives.
1. Export-exchange option. This alternative
would be the mostefficient, orleast-cost method,
for dealing with the West Coastsurplus. Itwould
reduce transportation costs the most relative to
the current system of shipment through the
Panama Canal, and thus would provide the
greatest incentive for expanding Alaskan pro-
duction. 1O On the other hand, this option would
involve a greater risk ofsupply interruptionthan
the otheralternatives, and would frustrate devel-
opment of a domestic refinery1distribution in-
frastructure for handling Alaskan oil.
In June 1979, North Slope crude sold for an
estimated $17.551 barrel on the U.S. Gulf Coast
(Table 4). However, North Slope producers
received a wellhead price of only about
$7.981 barrel, aftersubtractingthe trans-Alaskan
pipeline tariff of $6.321 barrel and the Valdez-
Panama Canal-Gulf Coast shipping cost of
$3.25/barrel. But under a swap arrangement,
North Slope oil could be shipped to Japanese
refineries in foreign tankers at a cost of only
about $0.40/barrel, and this cost saving wouldmean a $2.85/ barrel increase in the wellhead
price to North Slope producers. IfMexico Were
the third party in the exchange, Mexican produ-
cers similarly would benefit from diverting their
Japan-bound crudeto U.S. GulfCoastrefineries
at a shipping cost of only $0.40/barreL
Proponents ofexportexchangesmaintainthat
transportation-cost savings and wellhead-price
increases of these magnitudes are essential to
generate the necessary investments in expanded
North Slope production. Output from the main
Prudhoe Bay reservoir-the Sadlerochit~has
reached its potential capacity of 1.5 million bl d,
and will probably fall below that level by the
mid-1980's. Some output may become available
from the nearby-as yet untapped-Lisburne
and Kuparuk reserves. But a majorexpansion of
production-sufficient to meet the pipeline'sfull
potential of 2.0 million b/d-will require heavy
expenditures for developinghigh-costreserves in
the Beaufort Sea and other new areas.ll
The major drawback to the swap option-
insecurity ofsupplies-has led Congress to con-
tinue its strict restrictions on Alaskan oil ex-
Table 4
Estimated Net Return to Alaskan North Slope Oil Producers
In Selling to Various Markets, June 1979
(dollars per barrel)
United States' Japan2
West Coast Gulf Coast Scenario A Scenario B
Delivered Price 16.80 17.55 16.55 15.32
Less shipping cosl .95 3.25 .40' .40
Value at Valdez 15.85 14.30 16.15 14.92
Less Alaskan pipeline tariff 4 6.32 6.32 6.32 6.32
Value at Wellhead 9.53 7.98 9.83 8.60
Less severance tax (11.54%). state
royalty (12.5%). and property tax 2.32 1.97 2.39 2.11
Less operating costs & depreciation 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.53
Pretax Net 5.68 4.48 5.91 4.96
Less state income tax (9.36%) .53 .42 .55 .46
Less Federal income tax (46%) 2.37 1.87 2.47 2.07
Net Income Per Barrel 2.78 2.19 2.89 2.43
I Delivered prices and costs for selling North Slope crude on the West and GulfCoasts based on estimates by the PelToleum
lntel/igence Weekly, as modified by the author through further investigation. "Delivered price" in any given market usually
equals the delivered price ofSaudi marker crude. plus or minus any quality differential. Saudi marker delivered price is the
posted price Lo.b. in the Persian Gulf($14.54 inJune)plus the transportation cost to the particular market ($1 to the West
Coast. and $1.75 to the Gulf Coast). June selling prices in U.S. markets exceeded the prices this computation would yield.
however. due to the breakdown of the traditiot'laluniform OPEC pricing structure and the resultant surcharges added,to
posted prices by many OPEC producers.
2 The delivered price for North Slope crude in Japan(Scenario A) was estimated by first determininganeffective ratherthana
posted Saudi market price. That effective price was estimated tobe roughlyequal to the selling price ofNorth Slope crudeon
the Gulf Coast ($17.55) plus a quality differential (+$.50) minus transportation costs from the Persian Gulf (-$1.75), or to
$16.30. Using that Saudi marker price ($16.30). we then added the transportation costs from the Persian Gulf to Japan
(+$.75) minus a quality differential (~$.50) to derive art estimated delivered price ofNorth Slopecrude in Japanof$16.55.ln
Scenario B. it is assumed NorthSlopeproducerssharehalfofthetransportation cost savings ($1.43) withJapaneserefineries.
J Based on the use offoreign flag VLCC tankers atWorld-scale 50. Using U.S. !lag tankers. the rate would be about $1.30 per
barrel.
4 Includes charges for liability fund ($.05) and pipeline less ($.05).
Source: Petroleum lnte/ligence Weekly, June 18. 1979. page 9; estimatesdeveloped by the authorthroughcontacts withoil-
industry analysts.
12ports. Of course, increased domestic
production-with or without swap
arrangements-will tend to reduce net imports
ofpetroleum for anygiven level ofconsumption,
and thus will help to improve the U.S. oil-trade
balance. But swaps increase gross imports, and
so. do not reduce susceptibility to a cutoff of
foreign oil. Even if Alaskan oil were channeled
back into the domestic market during a supply
crisis, that action would simply transfer the
dislocation to Japan and would thus undermine
Japan-U.S. relationships.
Lifting the ban on exports also would elimi-
nate all. incentive for West Coast refiners to
retrofit their. plants to handle more Alaskan
crude, or for North Slope producers or other
investors to build pipelines to improve domestic
distribution ofcrude. Since theexport-exchange
arrangement would be the least-cost (and most
profitable) method for dealing with the Alaskan
surplus, the overseas market would be the pre-
ferred market for selling the crude. Without
assurance that Alaskan supplies would be avail-
able on the West Coast, refiners would have no
incentive to retrofit their plants. Similarly, with-
out any surplus to transport to other areasofthe
nation, investors would have no incentive to
pursue the less efficient pipeline alternative.
2. Refinery modification option. Within the
United States, transportationcosts are lowestfor
the West Coast market (Table 4), although costs
there are slightly higher than they would be
under the swap option because of the costly
requirement for using American-flag tankers. If
West Coast refiners carried out the necessary
modifications to fully utilize Alaskan produc-
tion, North Slope producers would realize this
transportation cost saving per each barrel ofoil
thatothenyise would be shipped through the
Panama Canal.
Elimination of price controls onrefined pro-
ducts would provide refineries with a strong
incentive to make the necessary investments.
\\lith ••decontrol, they could recover their in-
creased.costs and perhapseven widen theirprofit
margins. In this regard, they have already bene-
fitted from the so-called "tilt" rule for gasoline
pricinge-instituted in early March of 1979. 12
Still, they.\Vould have no incentive to modify
facilities if the swap option were available.
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North Slope producers would incur higher
production costs in serving the West Coast
market ifthey themselves built a desulfurization
plant at Valdez to upgrade theiroil. Theseadded
costs would offset some of the transportation
costs saved innot having to ship oil through the
Panama Canal. But producersalsowould realize
the price premium that low-sulfur crude com-
mands on the West Coast. On balance, then,
producers might benefit as much from this op-
tion as from the refinery modificationalterna-
tive.
3.Pipeline option. It is very difficult, if not
impossible, to evaluate the relative costs and
prices associated with this alternative. None.of
the proposed pipelines has received final appro-
val, although the Administrationhas.announced
its support ofthe Northern Tierline. Thus,start-
up and completion dates cannot be determined,
and overall cost and tariff estimates are highly
tenuous. Furthermore, comparisons aredifficult
because one proposed pipeline would be built
from scratch while others would incorporate
existing pipelines; in the latter case, forexample,
the nominal cost oftransportationwouldtendto
underestimate the true economic cost ofreplace-
ment.'3 The tariff per barrel associated with any
pipeline also would be highly dependent upon
the operating rate-that is, the amount of
throughput-yet rates ofcapacity utilization are
unknown.
Recent estimates suggest, however, thattrans-
portation costs could be lower with the Sohio
pipeline than with the Panama Canal alterna-
tive,14 which means of course higher wellhead
prices for producers. But in general, producers
apparently would benefit less from the pipeline
option than they would from the refinery-
modification option.
Summary and conclusions
Government regulations have been largely
responsible for creating a "surplus" of Alaskan
North Slope oil, defined in terms ofWest Coast
refinery capacity toprocess that relativelyheavy,
high-sulfur.crude.. Because of .environmental
regulationsaswell as thecompositionofregional
refined-product demand, West Coast refineries
need additional desulfurization anddownstream
cracking capacity to fully utilize North Slope
supplies. Yet price controls on refined productshave inhibited refineries from making the neCes-
sary investments. And because of other regula-
tions delaying domestic pipeline construction,
banning exports, and forbidding the use of
foreign tankers in U.S. intercoastal trade, North
Slope producers are required to ship theirexcess
output by U.S. tankers to Gulf Coast refineries
through the Panama Canal. But this approach is
one of the most inefficient possible ways of
dealing with the surplus.
In evaluating various alternatives, policymak-
ers must decide not only which alternative pro-
vides for the most efficient use of resources, but
also which is most effective in achieving the
nation's key energy objective ofreduced reliance
on foreign oil imports. These two objectives are
ofcourse somewhat related. The primary Way to
reduce reliance on oil imports is to increase
domestic production through the mechanism of
price incentives. Yet reducing transportation
costs through a more efficient distribution sys-
tem raises the producer price at the wellhead
and thus increases price incentives.
The current method of disposing of the
surplus~the PanamaCanal approach~tendsto
reduce the producer price at the wellhead, and
also to depress the North Slope selling price on
the West Coast. This approach consequently
serves to restrain potential increases in output,
since a major portion ofany substantial produc-
tion increase also would end in the "surplus"
stream and receive a lower wellhead price. Each
of the alternatives discussed 'in this paper---
export exchanges, pipelines, refinery retrofit-
ting, crude desulfurization~aredesignedin One
way or another to eliminate the bottleneckand
provide greater production incentive.
Export-exchange arrangements· would pro-
vide the least cost, or most efficient, rneansof
dealing with the surplus. Such a.rrangements
would providethe maximumtransportationcost
savings for North Slope crude that otherwise
would have to be shipped through the Panama
Canal. These savings would translate into the
greatest increase in producer wellhead prices,
and thus the greatest added incentive for in-
creased North Slope and other Alaskan produc-
tion. Each of the other options would call for
various amounts of investment in new construc-
tion. As such, each would provide relatively less
ofa transportation cost savingandrelatively less
inducement for expanded production than ex-
port exchanges. There is no clear "second best"
alternative to export exchanges in terms of
efficiency, largelybecause ofthe highly uncertain
nature of the estimated costs involved.
While economicefficiency alone would dictate
the adoption of the export-exchange option~
that is, the removal of Alaskan oil-export
controls~certaintrade-offs associated withthis
approach must also be considered. Export ex-
changes, although not affecting net oil imports,
would increase gross imports and thus increase
the nation's susceptibility to supply interrup-
tions. Also, if Congress permitted this option, it
would thereby tend to reduce, or even eliminate,
the incentive for producers or refiners to under-
take any of the other possible alternatives.
Regardless of what distribution option is
adopted, rising world oil prices will improve the
economic climatefor expandedAlaskan produc-
tion. The issue of whether or not to permit
Alaskan oil exportsboils down to whetherornot
the advantages of economic efficiency (and
greater producer price incentive) outweigh the
disadvantages of increased risk of supply inter-
ruption such exchanges would entail. Economic
factors alone argue in favor ofexportexchanges.
A decision to retain controls on exports requires
a political judgment that energy security is a
more important policy consideration than eco-
nomic efficiency alone.
FOOTNOTES
1. United States, Federal Energy Administration, North ally, crude oils having agravityof32 degrees API orless
Slope Crude-Where to? How? An Analysis of the are called heavy crude oils. Sour crude oils are those
Alternatives Available for the Transportation and Dis- that contain relatively high amounts of sulfur (greater
position ofAlaskan North Slope Crude, (November 29, than 0.5 percent).
1976), pp. 15-17. 3. United States, Presidential Task Force on Refonn of
2. North Slope oil is described as being heavy (27 Federal Energy Administration Regulation, Report on
degrees American Petroleum Institute (API) gravity) Federal Energy Administration Regulation, ed. MacA-
and sour (1 percent sulfur content). Heavy crude oils voy (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute
are those with a high density or low API gravity. Gener- for Public Policy Research, 1977), pp. 8-9, 60-64.
144. Alaska had been a significant oil producer prior to
the onset of Prudhoe Bay production in mid-1977. In
1976, the state produced about 190,000 bid of oil, with
mostof that output coming from the Kenai Peninsula/
Cook Inlet area in the southern part of the state.
5. At present, only one of the three major Prudhoe Bay
producers-namely, Standard Oil Company of Ohio
(Sohio)-has no refineries on the West Coast and thus
must transport North Slope crudetoGulfCoast refiner-
ies through the Panama Canal. IfAlaskan production
were to expand without a commensurate increase in
West Coastrefining capacityto handlethatcrude, other
producers alsocould be confronted with the problem of
transporting their surplus through the Panama Canal.
6. The entitlements program was established in1973to
equalize the effective acquisition costs of oil obtained
by U.S. refiners under the multi-tiered system of oil
prices resulting from Federal price controls on
domestically-produced oil. Under this program, refin-
ers having access to supplies of cheaper oil make cash
payments to refiners who depend on more expensive
oil, thus tending to equalize the effective acquisition
cost of lower-tier, upper-tier and imported crude oil to
the refiner. NorthSlope oil has been granted the entitle-
ment status of upper-tier or "new" oil which sells at the
world price. As a result, U.S. refiners using that oil are
granted the same entitlements benefits for Alaskan as
for foreign oil.
7. U.S. Executive Office of the President, The White
House Fact Sheet on the President's Oil Import Reduc-
tion Program (Washington, D.C., July 15, 1979), p. 2.
For a similar forecast see U.S. Congress, Congression-
al Budget Office, The DecontrolofDomestic OilPrices:
An Overview (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, May 1979) p. 14.
8. A number of independent studies have concluded
that world oil prices will rise sharply in real terms
between now and the early 1990's. See, for example,
Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies, Energy:
Global Prospects, 1985-2000 (New York: McGraw-Hili,
1977); Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, World Energy Outlook (Paris: OCED,
1977); United States Central Intelligence Agency, The
International Energy Situation: Outlook for 1985
(Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, April
1977). The prospect of supply stringency has intensifi-
ed in the light Of recent Iranian and Saudi Arabian
production plans.
9. Delivered price for North Slope crude in any given
market usually equals the delivered price for Saudi
marker crude, plus or minus any quality differential.
During 1979, there was a breakdown in the traditional
uniform OPEC pricing structure, however, as a result of
the Iranian crisis and consequent surcharges added to
posted prices among markets served by various produ-
cers. North Slope selling and wellhead prices were
similarly distorted.
10. It is for these reasons that the State of Alaska has
repeatedly pressed for export exchanges. That state
would benefit not only in terms of the return on its
royalty, i.e., ownership share, but from increased tax
revenues.
11. For adiscussion ofthis pointsee Howard M. Wilson,
"How Operators View Prudhoe Bay Now," The. Oil and
Gas Journal (February 6, 1979), p. 71; also, Arion R.
Tussing, The EffectsofCrude OilPipeline Tariffs on the
Economics ofPetroleum Development in ArcticAlaska
(Seattle, Washington: July 5, 1978).
12. The "gasoline tilt" rule, adopted by the Department
of Energy on March 1, 1979, permits up to 110 percent
ofcrudeoil cost increases to be allocated to gasoline on
a pro-rata, volumetric basis; it also allows refiners to
allocate to gasoline a percentage of refining costs
greater than the volumetric ratio. Previously, increases
in crude oil and refining costs (above the 1973-base
period) were allocated to refined products strictly on a
pro-rata volumetric basis. The average refinery crude
oil run yields about 44 percent gasoline. Consequently
only about 44 percent of crude oil and refinery cost
increases could be passed on in gasoline prices, de-
spite the fact that the costs of producing gasoline are
greater than those for most other refined products.
13. This point was stressed by Arion R. Tussing in
Economic and Policy Consideration in Choice of a
West Coast Oil Port (West Coast Oil Ports Inquiry,
Vancouver, British Columbia, November 1977), pp. 5-7.
14. Statement of Alton W. Whitehouse, Jr., Chairman of
the Board, The Standard Oil Company (Ohio), before
the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
sources (Washington, D.C., March 27, 1979), p. 8.
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